- From: <Ivan.Arias-Rodriguez AT nokia.com>
- To: <Michael.Tuexen AT icn.siemens.de>, <ajung AT exp-math.uni-essen.de>, <randall AT stewart.chicago.il.us>
- Cc: <john.loughney AT nokia.com>, <discussion AT sctp.de>, <thomas.hollaus AT siemens.at>, <tsvwg AT ietf.org>
- Subject: [SCTP-Discussion] RE: [Tsvwg] Possible DoS in SCTP ?
- Date: Thu Feb 14 18:32:01 2002
- List-id: SCTP Discussions <discussion.sctp.de>
Hi all,
This is TCP specific, but it is a very interesting lecture about DoS
attacks... Check this out if you are interested:
http://grc.com/dos/grcdos.htm
I had to read it until the end when I started. Maybe because I didn't
really know that much about DoS attacks... :-)
Enjoy!
BR Iván Arias Rodríguez
>
-----Original Message-----
>
From: ext Tuexen Michael
>
[mailto:Michael.Tuexen AT icn.siemens.de]
>
Sent: 14. February 2002 18:10
>
To: 'Andreas Jungmaier'; Randall Stewart
>
Cc: Loughney John (NRC/Helsinki);
>
discussion AT sctp.de;
>
Hollaus Thomas;
>
tsvwg AT ietf.org
>
Subject: RE: [Tsvwg] Possible DoS in SCTP ?
>
>
>
Dear all,
>
>
if I understand DDoS attacks correcly, they use some mechanism
>
to generate a lot of packets by sending one. Using the SCTP
>
feature currently being the discussed you are generating one
>
packet by sending one. You can send this directly.
>
>
Best regards
>
Michael
>
>
Michael Tuexen Tel.: +49 89 722 47210
>
Siemens AG Fax: +49 89 722 48212
>
ICN WN CS SE 5 E-mail:
>
Michael.Tuexen AT icn.siemens.de
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
>
> From: Andreas Jungmaier
>
> [SMTP:ajung AT exp-math.uni-essen.de]
>
> Sent: Thursday, February 14, 2002 6:03 PM
>
> To: Randall Stewart
>
> Cc:
>
> john.loughney AT nokia.com;
>
>
>
> discussion AT sctp.de;
>
> Hollaus
>
Thomas;
>
tsvwg AT ietf.org
>
> Subject: Re: [Tsvwg] Possible DoS in SCTP ?
>
>
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
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> Hash: SHA1
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>
>
> Hi all,
>
> please see my comments inline.
>
>
>
> > > > Andreas:
>
> > > >
>
> > > > There is no amplification here though... so it is no
>
> > > > different than if Evil-E sent the aborts itself
>
> > > > to all the "victims" V... it must send N packets
>
> > > > to get N packets to victims... this is no
>
> > > > different than a UDP attack.. in fact a UDP attack
>
> > > > is easier...
>
> > >
>
> > > Well, *almost*. The only problem I see here is that many
>
> > > network installations by now have already adapted to UDP
>
> > > attacks, e.g. by filtering excessive amounts (or simply all)
>
> > > ICMP dest. unreachble packets (which are subsequently
>
> > > jamming the targets/victims network).
>
> > >
>
> > > With SCTP, however, it is not that simple: you get back
>
> > > a transport layer packet that is much harder to filter.
>
> >
>
> > How is SCTP harder to filter than UDP.. UDP IS a transport
>
> > protocol and the ports in the UDP/TCP header are in the
>
> > same place as the SCTP header...
>
>
>
> Yes, but the UDP does not cause the DoS -- it is the ICMP
>
> destination unreachable packets sent in reply to a UDP packet, that
>
> cause the problems.
>
>
>
> > > Think about it: there have been MANY distributed DoS attacks
>
> > > based on UDP, why shouldn't there be some based on SCTP some
>
> > > day ?
>
> >
>
> > Or TCP.. at this level though your attacker is limited
>
> > to the bandwidth/cpu of the Evil-E machine. This is NO
>
> > different than TCP or UDP or anything else out there
>
> > now...
>
>
>
> No, that was my point. In typical DDoS scenarios, there is
>
> thousands of Evil-E's, directed by one central process. This has
>
> been done by e.g. the Stacheldraht based DDoS attacks.
>
> I am not saying this is much of an issue, I am saying that
>
> SCTP can be used, as other protocols, for (D)DoS attacks.
>
>
>
> Best regards,
>
> Andreas
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > > BTW, John: I am not concerned about cycles for processing
>
> > > ABORTs. The problem really arises when an attacker starts a lot
>
> > > of "Evil Endpoints E", that all have one target: Victim V.
>
> > > The scarce resource is bandwidth.
>
> > >
>
> > > > Andreas Jungmaier wrote:
>
> > > > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
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> > > > > Hash: SHA1
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> > > > >
>
> > > > > Dear all,
>
> > > > >
>
> > > > > I am sorry for not explaining more exactly what I meant.
>
> > > > > I am assuming an attack with IP-Spoofing. The evil attacker
>
> > > > > (say E) is spoofing poor victim (say V), using oblivious
>
> > > > > server (say) O.
>
> > > > >
>
> > > > > Now,
>
> > > > >
>
> > > > > Evil-Endpoint E:
>
> > > > > Source IP V(spoofed)
>
> > > > > Dest IP O
>
> > > > > SCTP-INIT (invalid params) ----------------> Server O
>
> > > > > /-------------/
>
> > > > > SCTP-Abort,Error /
>
> > > > > Poor Victim V <--------------/
>
> > > > >
>
> > > > > Now, if E can use V, it could send such packets to
>
a large number
>
> > > > > of servers. And then V gets bombed with Aborts.
>
> > > > >
>
> > > > > I agree fully, that an established association is
>
safe, but that
>
> > > > > was not the issue I was thinking about. Comments ?
>
> > >
>
> > > - --
>
> > > -
>
> > >
>
--------------------------------------------------------------
>
----------
>
> > > Dipl.-Ing. Andreas Jungmaier |
>
_>
>
> > > Computer Networking Technology Group | ASCII
>
ribbon campaign ( )
>
> > > University of Essen | - against
>
HTML email X
>
> > > http://www.exp-math.uni-essen.de/~ajung |
>
& vcards / \
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> - --
>
> -
>
--------------------------------------------------------------
>
----------
>
> Dipl.-Ing. Andreas Jungmaier |
>
_
>
> Computer Networking Technology Group | ASCII ribbon
>
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>
> University of Essen | - against HTML
>
email X
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> http://www.exp-math.uni-essen.de/~ajung | &
>
vcards / \
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