- From: Andreas Jungmaier <ajung AT exp-math.uni-essen.de>
- To: discussion AT sctp.de, Hollaus Thomas <thomas.hollaus AT siemens.at>, "'discussion AT sctp.de'" <discussion AT sctp.de>
- Cc: tsvwg AT ietf.org
- Subject: Possible DoS in SCTP ? (was: [SCTP-Discussion] receive of unexpected chunks with invalid parameters)
- Date: Thu Feb 14 12:32:00 2002
- List-id: SCTP Discussions <discussion.sctp.de>
- Organization: University Essen
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Hello Thomas, dear all,
please see my comments below.
I am CC'ing TSVWG to discuss this: does this open up a possibility
for DoS attacks ?
On Thursday, 14. February 2002 08:56, Hollaus Thomas wrote:
>
Dear all,
>
>
Question to unexpected chunks with invalid mandatory parameters (e.g.
>
MIS=0, OS=0, Init-Tag=0):
>
As far as I understand the sctp.de implementation, it is possible to attack
>
a running association with e.g. an INIT and invalid mandatory parameters.
>
After receive of that unexpected chunks the prototype does delete the
>
running association (pre 16: sctp-control.c, func scr_init, line 677). Is
>
that a correct behaviour according to RFC?
The implementation probably should return an ABORT with an Error Chunk
that specifies the appropriate error code, as per RFC 2960:
Cause Code
Value Cause Code
--------- ----------------
1 Invalid Stream Identifier
2 Missing Mandatory Parameter
3 Stale Cookie Error
4 Out of Resource
5 Unresolvable Address
6 Unrecognized Chunk Type
--> 7 Invalid Mandatory Parameter
8 Unrecognized Parameters
9 No User Data
10 Cookie Received While Shutting Down
However, I am not actually sure that this is a good idea, since that
would make it easily possible (with IP spoofing) to start
denial-of-service attacks.
I think the rationale behind this in the RFC was to stop a broken
client from keeping retransmitting wrong INITs and tell it directly
WHAT is wrong, and that something is wrong.
Regards,
Andreas
- --
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Dipl.-Ing. Andreas Jungmaier | _
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