- From: Randall Stewart <randall AT stewart.chicago.il.us>
- To: Andreas Jungmaier <ajung AT exp-math.uni-essen.de>
- Cc: discussion AT sctp.de, Hollaus Thomas <thomas.hollaus AT siemens.at>, tsvwg AT ietf.org
- Subject: [SCTP-Discussion] Re: [Tsvwg] Possible DoS in SCTP ? (was: reception of invalid parameters)
- Date: Thu Feb 14 18:32:51 2002
- List-id: SCTP Discussions <discussion.sctp.de>
Andreas:
There is no amplification here though... so it is no
different than if Evil-E sent the aborts itself
to all the "victims" V... it must send N packets
to get N packets to victims... this is no
different than a UDP attack.. in fact a UDP attack
is easier...
R
Andreas Jungmaier wrote:
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Dear all,
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I am sorry for not explaining more exactly what I meant.
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I am assuming an attack with IP-Spoofing. The evil attacker
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(say E) is spoofing poor victim (say V), using oblivious
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server (say) O.
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Now,
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Evil-Endpoint E:
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Source IP V(spoofed)
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Dest IP O
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SCTP-INIT (invalid params) ----------------> Server O
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/-------------/
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SCTP-Abort,Error /
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Poor Victim V <--------------/
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Now, if E can use V, it could send such packets to a large number
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of servers. And then V gets bombed with Aborts.
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I agree fully, that an established association is safe, but that
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was not the issue I was thinking about. Comments ?
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>
Andreas
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> Andreas Jungmaier wrote:
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> > Hello Thomas, dear all,
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> >
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> > please see my comments below.
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> > I am CC'ing TSVWG to discuss this: does this open up a possibility
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> > for DoS attacks ?
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> >
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> > On Thursday, 14. February 2002 08:56, Hollaus Thomas wrote:
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> > > Dear all,
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> > >
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> > > Question to unexpected chunks with invalid mandatory parameters (e.g.
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> > > MIS=0, OS=0, Init-Tag=0):
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> > > As far as I understand the sctp.de implementation, it is possible to
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> > > attack a running association with e.g. an INIT and invalid mandatory
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> > > parameters. After receive of that unexpected chunks the prototype does
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> > > delete the running association (pre 16: sctp-control.c, func scr_init,
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> > > line 677). Is that a correct behaviour according to RFC?
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> >
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> > The implementation probably should return an ABORT with an Error Chunk
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> > that specifies the appropriate error code, as per RFC 2960:
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> > Cause Code
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> > Value Cause Code
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> > --------- ----------------
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> > 1 Invalid Stream Identifier
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> > 2 Missing Mandatory Parameter
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> > 3 Stale Cookie Error
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> > 4 Out of Resource
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> > 5 Unresolvable Address
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> > 6 Unrecognized Chunk Type
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> > --> 7 Invalid Mandatory Parameter
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> > 8 Unrecognized Parameters
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> > 9 No User Data
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> > 10 Cookie Received While Shutting Down
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> >
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> > However, I am not actually sure that this is a good idea, since that
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> > would make it easily possible (with IP spoofing) to start
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> > denial-of-service attacks.
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> > I think the rationale behind this in the RFC was to stop a broken
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> > client from keeping retransmitting wrong INITs and tell it directly
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> > WHAT is wrong, and that something is wrong.
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- --
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- ------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Dipl.-Ing. Andreas Jungmaier | _
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Computer Networking Technology Group | ASCII ribbon campaign ( )
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University of Essen | - against HTML email X
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http://www.exp-math.uni-essen.de/~ajung | & vcards / \
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--
Randall R. Stewart
randall AT stewart.chicago.il.us
815-342-5222 (cell phone)
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