- From: Andreas Jungmaier <ajung AT exp-math.uni-essen.de>
- To: Randall Stewart <randall AT stewart.chicago.il.us>
- Cc: john.loughney AT nokia.com, discussion AT sctp.de, Hollaus Thomas <thomas.hollaus AT siemens.at>, tsvwg AT ietf.org
- Subject: [SCTP-Discussion] Re: [Tsvwg] Possible DoS in SCTP ?
- Date: Thu Feb 14 17:07:01 2002
- List-id: SCTP Discussions <discussion.sctp.de>
- Organization: University Essen
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Hi all,
please see my comments inline.
>
> > Andreas:
>
> >
>
> > There is no amplification here though... so it is no
>
> > different than if Evil-E sent the aborts itself
>
> > to all the "victims" V... it must send N packets
>
> > to get N packets to victims... this is no
>
> > different than a UDP attack.. in fact a UDP attack
>
> > is easier...
>
>
>
> Well, *almost*. The only problem I see here is that many
>
> network installations by now have already adapted to UDP
>
> attacks, e.g. by filtering excessive amounts (or simply all)
>
> ICMP dest. unreachble packets (which are subsequently
>
> jamming the targets/victims network).
>
>
>
> With SCTP, however, it is not that simple: you get back
>
> a transport layer packet that is much harder to filter.
>
>
How is SCTP harder to filter than UDP.. UDP IS a transport
>
protocol and the ports in the UDP/TCP header are in the
>
same place as the SCTP header...
Yes, but the UDP does not cause the DoS -- it is the ICMP
destination unreachable packets sent in reply to a UDP packet, that
cause the problems.
>
> Think about it: there have been MANY distributed DoS attacks
>
> based on UDP, why shouldn't there be some based on SCTP some
>
> day ?
>
>
Or TCP.. at this level though your attacker is limited
>
to the bandwidth/cpu of the Evil-E machine. This is NO
>
different than TCP or UDP or anything else out there
>
now...
No, that was my point. In typical DDoS scenarios, there is
thousands of Evil-E's, directed by one central process. This has
been done by e.g. the Stacheldraht based DDoS attacks.
I am not saying this is much of an issue, I am saying that
SCTP can be used, as other protocols, for (D)DoS attacks.
Best regards,
Andreas
>
> BTW, John: I am not concerned about cycles for processing
>
> ABORTs. The problem really arises when an attacker starts a lot
>
> of "Evil Endpoints E", that all have one target: Victim V.
>
> The scarce resource is bandwidth.
>
>
>
> > Andreas Jungmaier wrote:
>
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> > > Hash: SHA1
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> > >
>
> > > Dear all,
>
> > >
>
> > > I am sorry for not explaining more exactly what I meant.
>
> > > I am assuming an attack with IP-Spoofing. The evil attacker
>
> > > (say E) is spoofing poor victim (say V), using oblivious
>
> > > server (say) O.
>
> > >
>
> > > Now,
>
> > >
>
> > > Evil-Endpoint E:
>
> > > Source IP V(spoofed)
>
> > > Dest IP O
>
> > > SCTP-INIT (invalid params) ----------------> Server O
>
> > > /-------------/
>
> > > SCTP-Abort,Error /
>
> > > Poor Victim V <--------------/
>
> > >
>
> > > Now, if E can use V, it could send such packets to a large number
>
> > > of servers. And then V gets bombed with Aborts.
>
> > >
>
> > > I agree fully, that an established association is safe, but that
>
> > > was not the issue I was thinking about. Comments ?
>
>
>
> - --
>
> -
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Dipl.-Ing. Andreas Jungmaier | _
>
> Computer Networking Technology Group | ASCII ribbon campaign ( )
>
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- --
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Dipl.-Ing. Andreas Jungmaier | _
Computer Networking Technology Group | ASCII ribbon campaign ( )
University of Essen | - against HTML email X
http://www.exp-math.uni-essen.de/~ajung | & vcards / \
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