- From: Randall Stewart <randall AT stewart.chicago.il.us>
- To: Andreas Jungmaier <ajung AT exp-math.uni-essen.de>
- Cc: discussion AT sctp.de, Hollaus Thomas <thomas.hollaus AT siemens.at>, tsvwg AT ietf.org
- Subject: Re: [Tsvwg] Possible DoS in SCTP ? (was: [SCTP-Discussion] receive of unexpected chunks with invalid parameters)
- Date: Thu Feb 14 18:32:29 2002
- List-id: SCTP Discussions <discussion.sctp.de>
Andreas:
I don't think so.. first of all the idea is this (correct
me if I am wrong):
Endpoint-A <------------assoc----------> Endpoint-Z
Now someone else does this (with invalid mandatory parameters):
Evil-Endpoint :(from-E-A)INIT----------------> Endpoint-Z
Now Endpoint-Z SHOULD send back an ABORT to Evil-Endpoint but
it SHOULD NOT touch the association.. since this is an
overlapping case. As Michael said the only way that Endpoint-A
would tear down the association is if Evil-Endpoint guessed
or knew the V-Tag of the original association AND put that
in the I-Tag in the INIT. In that case (if Evil-Endpoint had
this information) it could just as easily:
a) Send a ABORT() directly to Endpoint-A
b) Send a Message in forged to Endpoint-A .. assuming if it
has the V-Tag it also has the sequence number of the next
TSN.
All of these presume more of a man-in-the middle type attack
where the Evil one can see what each side has...
I don't see this as a problem..
R
Andreas Jungmaier wrote:
>
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Hello Thomas, dear all,
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>
please see my comments below.
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I am CC'ing TSVWG to discuss this: does this open up a possibility
>
for DoS attacks ?
>
>
On Thursday, 14. February 2002 08:56, Hollaus Thomas wrote:
>
> Dear all,
>
>
>
> Question to unexpected chunks with invalid mandatory parameters (e.g.
>
> MIS=0, OS=0, Init-Tag=0):
>
> As far as I understand the sctp.de implementation, it is possible to
>
> attack
>
> a running association with e.g. an INIT and invalid mandatory parameters.
>
> After receive of that unexpected chunks the prototype does delete the
>
> running association (pre 16: sctp-control.c, func scr_init, line 677). Is
>
> that a correct behaviour according to RFC?
>
>
The implementation probably should return an ABORT with an Error Chunk
>
that specifies the appropriate error code, as per RFC 2960:
>
Cause Code
>
Value Cause Code
>
--------- ----------------
>
1 Invalid Stream Identifier
>
2 Missing Mandatory Parameter
>
3 Stale Cookie Error
>
4 Out of Resource
>
5 Unresolvable Address
>
6 Unrecognized Chunk Type
>
--> 7 Invalid Mandatory Parameter
>
8 Unrecognized Parameters
>
9 No User Data
>
10 Cookie Received While Shutting Down
>
>
However, I am not actually sure that this is a good idea, since that
>
would make it easily possible (with IP spoofing) to start
>
denial-of-service attacks.
>
I think the rationale behind this in the RFC was to stop a broken
>
client from keeping retransmitting wrong INITs and tell it directly
>
WHAT is wrong, and that something is wrong.
>
>
Regards,
>
Andreas
>
>
- --
>
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
Dipl.-Ing. Andreas Jungmaier | _
>
Computer Networking Technology Group | ASCII ribbon campaign ( )
>
University of Essen | - against HTML email X
>
http://www.exp-math.uni-essen.de/~ajung | & vcards / \
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--
Randall R. Stewart
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